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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

DO WE KNOW WHO WE ARE BY KNOWING WHO WE ARE NOT?: THE
EFFECTS OF INCLUDING DISLIKED OTHERS IN THE SELF-CONCEPT
People include other people in their self-concept. Research has examined the
causes and effects of including liked, but not disliked others into the self-concept. Liked
others are included because of a motivation to affiliate and get closer to the other person.
The current investigation examined whether disliked others are included as a result of a
motivation to differentiate and distinguish oneself from the other person. It also examined
how self-concept inclusion of disliked others affects self-concept clarity. First, I tested
whether people include disliked others into their self-concepts by showing a memory bias
for disliked others similar to that of liked others (Study 1). Liked others, but not disliked
others or acquaintances, showed this memory bias. Next, I tested whether people were
motivated to differentiate themselves from disliked others by measuring whether they had
slower reaction times when characterizing the self with traits similar to those of disliked
others (Study 2). I did not find this effect. Finally, neither study showed a mediating
effect of self-concept clarity. These results failed to show support for the hypothesis that
disliked others are included in the self-concept and that including others in the self affects
self-concept clarity.
KEYWORDS: Self-Concept Clarity, Self-Concept, Disliked Others, Interpersonal
Relationships
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Chapter One: Introduction
The self-concept is both a dynamic and stable entity. It is a person’s sense of who
they are, including attributes that describe them as well as objects, roles, and people who
are important to them (e.g. Markus & Wurf, 1987). Interpersonal context and processes
play an important role in the self-concept (e.g. Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). For example,
people incorporate significant people in their lives into their self-concepts (e.g. Aron,
Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). A large body of research
demonstrates that close others are incorporated in the self and such self-other overlap has
significant cognitive consequences. What has not yet been studied, however, is the role of
disliked others in the self-concept. Theories of the self indicate that people’s interactions
with others affect their self-concept (e.g. Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934; Markus & Wurf,
1987). This implies that people’s self-concepts are influenced not only by people they
like and are close to, but also by people that they dislike.
I proposed that disliked others were also included in people’s self-concepts.
Previous research supports the idea of an affiliation-based motivation for self-concept
inclusion (e.g. Aron et al., 1991; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). People who are liked,
especially those who are close to us, are incorporated in the self so that we can become
more like them. I predicted that people also have a distinctiveness-based motivation for
self-concept inclusion. The current research tested the hypothesis that significant people
who are disliked are incorporated into the self for the purpose of differentiating ourselves
from them and this distinctiveness motivation should increase people’s self-concept
clarity.
Inclusion of Others in the Self-Concept
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The self-concept is a dynamic reflection of the social world to which a person
belongs and the interpersonal relationships they have within that world (e.g. Markus &
Wurf, 1987). The people that others interact with have a significant impact on their selfconcepts, regardless of whether they are liked or disliked. Early research on the self
posited that people had as many social selves as they did people who knew them,
regardless of whether they liked or disliked these people (James, 1890).
Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) were the first to expand on James’s theory of the
self. Cooley introduced the concept of the “looking-glass self.” According to this theory,
a person’s self-concept is not composed of their perceptions of themselves, but instead is
composed of what they think others think of them (Cooley, 1902). The self-concept arises
from a person’s interpretation of how others react or how they think others will react to
him or her (Mead, 1934). To anticipate others’ reactions, people learn to perceive the
world as others do. This knowledge is incorporated into a person’s sense of self and
guides their behavior, even in the absence of others (Mead, 1934). According to Mead’s
theory, people have as many selves as they have social roles. The more important the role
is, the more important that particular self (Mead, 1934). Given that negative events and
information have a greater impact on the self than positive ones do (see Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001 for a review), negative roles should be at least as
important, if not more important, than positive roles. The present research also compared
the effects of liked and disliked others on the self-concept.
The social context, especially our interaction partners, play an important role in
the self-concept. For example, people’s ideas of not only who they are, but also who they
want to become or fear becoming are incorporated into the self-concept (Markus &
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Nurius, 1986). These possible selves are the pieces of the self-concept that represent
hopes, fears, goals, and threats. These possible selves derive from salient categories,
often based on personal history and experiences (Markus, 1977). Negative relationships
are a likely candidate for a salient category from which to derive possible selves. People
who do not want to become or fear becoming like a disliked other should have possible
selves representing themselves with characteristics of the disliked other. The existence of
these possible selves may increase people’s desire to differentiate from a disliked other.
The next section will discuss what impact including others in the self-concept has on it.
Effects of Including Others in the Self-Concept
One of the consequences of expanding the self to include others is including the
identities of that person into the self (Aron & Aron, 1986). Several empirical studies
demonstrate this effect for liked others. For example, people show better memory for
words associated with friends than with unknown others (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989).
After constructing sentences with the name of a friend or an unknown other, people
remembered more of the nouns in the friend versus unknown other sentences on
unexpected recall tests (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989). Self-relevant information, such as
information about people important to the self, is remembered better than other
information (see Symons & Johnson, 1997 for a review). Similarly, people show better
memory for nouns that they previously imagined they or a close other (i.e. their mother)
interacting with compared to a stranger (i.e. a celebrity) (Aron et al., 1991). People
remembered as many nouns paired with themselves as nouns paired with their mothers.
These studies demonstrate that people who are included in the self-concept are
treated like the self when it comes to recall. I expected the same pattern to be shown for
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disliked others as for liked others, but through a different mechanism. In the above
studies, people are including liked others into the self-concept as a result of an affiliation
motivation. Because they want to get closer to liked others, they include them in their
self-concept, resulting in superior recognition for liked others. I expected that disliked
others would be included into the self-concept as a result of a differentiation motivation.
Because people want to differentiate themselves from disliked others, they include them
in their self-concept, resulting in superior recognition for disliked others.
Additional evidence demonstrates that people extend their self-concepts to
incorporate the attributes of liked others. For example, participants show slower reaction
times correctly rejecting attributes that are descriptive of the self but not of a close other
(Aron et al., 1991). The slower reaction times indicate that there is some cognitive
overlap between the self and other, indicating the inclusion of the other in the selfconcept. Discrepancies between traits that describe one person but not the other produce
some confusion. People are motivated to be closer to liked others and therefore have a
more difficult time acknowledging their differences. I predict a similar pattern for
disliked others; discrepancies between traits that describe both the self as well as a
disliked other should also produce confusion. If people are motivated to differentiate
themselves from disliked others, they will have a more difficult time acknowledging their
similarities.
The motivation to draw closer to liked others is not due solely to shared
experience between these individuals. People show the same self-concept inclusion for
traits that they imagine a liked other having (Slotter & Gardner, 2009). Participants
imagined a conversation between themselves and their romantic partner or an
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acquaintance in which the other tells them about an attribute that was important to them.
This attribute was one that was pre-selected to be not descriptive of the participant or the
romantic partner. Following the imagined scenario, participants reported greater selfintegration with their partner than with the acquaintance (Slotter & Gardner, 2009).
Specifically, participants rated the target attribute as more indicative of themselves than
they had initially. They also took longer to correctly reject the attribute in a reaction time
task. People are motivated to draw closer to a liked other by integrating information
relevant to their partner’s sense of self into their own self-concept, even without shared
experience of this information. A similar process should occur for disliked others.
Effects of Disliked Others on the Self
The available research on disliked others focuses primarily on enemy
relationships. Although the present research focuses on others that are disliked and it is
possible to dislike someone without considering them an enemy, an enemy is still a type
of disliked other. Research on enemies contributes some insight onto the topic of
disliked others. Over 70% of adults report having an enemy, or someone who actively
and intentionally used power to block their goals and inflict harm (Holt, 1989; Wiseman
& Duck, 1995). Given that the characteristics of an enemy are more stringent than those
of a disliked other, it is likely that a greater number of people would report knowing at
least one person they dislike. Some researchers claim that people have a fundamental
need to have enemies (Barash, 1994; Boyer, 1986; Volkan, 1985). Indeed, the presence of
enemy relationships is found across cultures. Evidence of enemy relationships was found
in Ghana as well as in North America (Adams, 2005). Despite the importance of enemy
relationships, however, very little research has been performed on this topic.
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Existing research posits that enemyship (or “the perception that another person or
group is using influence and power to undermine one’s own goals and well-being;
Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 2010) serves an important psychological function.
Specifically, enemies are perceived to be an influential source of misfortune in people’s
lives. Controlling that misfortune by understanding it minimizes the threat it poses.
Enemyship allows people to maintain a sense of perceived control over their lives
because it allows them to identify and understand environmental threat (Sullivan et al.,
2010). Incorporating a disliked other into one’s self-concept should increase
understanding of the other and the perception of control over them.
Other research suggests that enemies may be included in the self-concept. The
development of enemy relationships in children depends on the attainment of a more
developed self-concept (Bigelow, 1977; Hesse and Mack, 1991). People thus do not
possess enemies before having a well-developed self-concept, suggesting that the selfconcept plays a crucial role in enemy relationships. Additionally, enemies dominate one
another’s actions, thoughts, and feelings (Rieber & Kelly, 1991), suggesting that
cognitive representations of these individuals are close at hand. This parallels what is
known about including liked others in the self-concept. Research has shown that
significant other representations are chronically accessible (Andersen, Glassman, Chen,
& Cole, 1995; Chen, Andersen, & Hinkley, 1999). If representations of both liked and
disliked others possess a high baseline level of accessibility, it is likely that both are
included in people’s self-concepts.
The need to have enemies stems from people’s desire to maintain a favorable selfimage (Boyer, 1986). Incorporating enemies or disliked others into a person’s self-
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concept and distancing oneself from them may allow people to maintain a positive image
of themselves. As an exploratory hypothesis, I also measured state social self-esteem to
tap into this mechanism. This process is similar to engaging in downward social
comparisons. Festinger (1954) hypothesized that people have a unidimensional drive
upward. That is, the drive to appear more capable than others involves an ego-enhancing
motive that is better served by making downward comparisons (see Suls, 1977).
Comparing oneself to less fortunate others enables the self to deduce that it is better off
than the other. Although less fortunate others aren’t necessarily disliked, comparing
oneself to disliked others may serve a similar function. Additional research empirically
studies situations in which downward comparisons are made. Under conditions of threat,
people responded by making a downward comparison for the purpose of selfenhancement (Hakmiller, 1966). The presence of disliked other—real, imagined, or
implied—may serve as a threat. Differentiating oneself from a disliked other that is
included in the self-concept may serve a similar self-enhancing purpose.
Recent research shows that one mechanism by which people are motivated to
include disliked others in the self-concept is romantic jealousy (Slotter, Lucas, Jakubiak,
& Lasslett, 2013). When people experience romantic jealousy toward a romantic rival,
they are motivated to change their self-concepts to become more similar to this rival in
order to keep their partner’s attention. Specifically, the experience of jealousy of a
romantic rival as well as the perception that their romantic partner was interested in a
rival predicted increased feelings of similarity to a romantic rival. Experimentally
induced jealousy also mediated the relationship between perceiving the partner as
interested in a rival and self-concept change toward the rival (Slotter et al., 2013).
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My research proposes to show a different mechanism by which people are
motivated to include disliked others in the self-concept, that is, distinctiveness. Slotter
and colleagues’ (2013) research shows that in order to keep one’s partner faithful, people
are willing to change themselves to become more like a disliked other— specifically a
romantic rival. However, when they do not feel jealousy or think that their partner is
interested in the rival, they do not show these effects. The effects are limited to situations
in which people are motivated to become more like the rival. I expected that my research
will extend that of Slotter and colleagues’ to show that when people are not motivated to
become similar to disliked others, but instead are motivated to become distinct from
them, they will include disliked others into the self-concept to differentiate themselves
from them.
Effects on Self-Concept Clarity
I expected to find that including others into the self-concept would increase selfconcept clarity. Self-concept clarity refers to the extent to which self-knowledge is
clearly defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable (Campbell et al., 1996).
Relational selves serve as a sense of clarity about who the self is in relation to others. The
relational self includes knowledge about the self linked in memory to that of significant
others. It exists at multiple levels of specificity, is capable of being contextually or
chronically activated, and is composed of self-aspects that characterize the self when
relating to significant others (Chen, Boucher, & Tapias, 2006). According to this model,
the relational self provides the self-regulatory direction that people who lack a clear sense
of self are missing (Chen et al., 2006). In other words, it improves self-concept clarity.
Possessing information about who one is in relation to others improves self-concept
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clarity, while a lack of this information decreases it. Notably, the others can be close,
liked others or disliked others. Including liked or disliked others in the self-concept
should thus increase a person’s self-concept clarity.
Overview of Current Research
The present research examined the effects of disliked others on the self. I
predicted that disliked others would be incorporated into people’s self-concepts.
Specifically, I predicted that people have improved memory for words associated with
both liked and disliked others, indicating that both liked and disliked others are
incorporated into people’s self concepts. I also predicted that people will be faster to
classify adjectives as self-descriptive or not if the adjective is descriptive of a disliked
other or not respectively. Finally, I hypothesized that including disliked others in the selfconcept would increase people’s self-concept clarity. Specifically, in both studies, people
who differentiated themselves from disliked others, but not acquaintances, would show
increased self-concept clarity. As an exploratory hypothesis, I also measured whether
people who differentiate themselves from disliked others, but not acquaintances, showed
increased state social self-esteem.

9

Chapter Two: Study 1
In Study 1, I tested the idea that both liked and disliked others are incorporated
into people’s self-concepts. People show improved memory for concepts associated with
friends rather than with unknown others (Aron et al., 1991; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989).
Modeling Greenwald and Banaji’s (1989) procedure, Study 1 attempted to replicate this
effect with both liked and disliked others. I predicted that people would have improved
memory for concepts associated with both liked and disliked others, but not
acquaintances. I also predicted that the inclusion of liked and disliked others, but not
acquaintances, into the self-concept will increase people’s self-concept clarity.
Method
Participants
Participants were 446 undergraduates (359 female) from the University of
Kentucky, recruited from the Psychology subject pool. On average, participants were
19.04 years old, SD = 2.05. Participants received partial course credit in exchange for
participating in my study.
Measures
Self-Concept Clarity Scale. To assess self-concept clarity, I asked participants to
complete the Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al., 1996; See Appendix A). This
scale is a 12-item measure in which participants rated how much they agreed with several
statements about themselves on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree). These statements assessed how much self-knowledge is clearly and confidently
defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable. I modified the items in the original
scale slightly in order to measure state rather than trait levels of self-concept clarity (e.g.
“At this moment, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am.”) This scale
10

demonstrated good reliability, α = .87 for initial self-concept clarity, α = .90 for selfconcept clarity at time 2.
State Social Self-Esteem Scale. To assess state social self-esteem, I asked
participants to complete the social subscale of the State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton &
Polivy, 1991; See Appendix B). This subscale is a 7-item measure that assesses
participants’ social self-esteem at a given point in time. Participants rate how much each
item is true of themselves at the present time on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at All) to 5
(Extremely) (e.g. “I feel that there are others who respect and admire me.”) This scale
demonstrated good reliability, α = .88 for initial state social self-esteem, α = .92 for state
social self-esteem at time 2.
Sentence-pairing task. Participants wrote 10 sentences, one for each of the
generated names. Participants were instructed that each sentence should include a specific
name (identified by number) and assigned noun. Nouns from Greenwald and Banaji’s
(1989) study were used (See Appendix C). They included names of concrete objects from
different noun categories. Participants typed their sentences on the computer after being
given their sheet of names and the target nouns for each. General instructions for the task
preceded the spaces for the sentences:

“If the task is ‘Create a sentence using name #4 and the word REFRIGERATOR’,
you should turn to your sheet of names and look up name #4. If name #4 happens
to be ‘Jones,’ then a suitable sentence might be:
Jones spent all Saturday morning repairing the refrigerator.
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The sentence should be constructed so that the person and object are actively
involved with one another.”
Inclusion of Other in Self (IOS). This scale assesses people’s closeness to others
(Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). Participants were given an image of seven pairs of
overlapping circles, with varying degrees of overlap. For each person whose name they
wrote, participants were asked to select one of the seven circles to indicate the degree of
closeness they currently felt to that person as well as the degree of closeness they wanted
to feel to that person (See Appendix D).
Procedure
Participants came to the lab expecting to participate in a study about trivia. After
receiving a description of the study and signing a consent form, participants completed
the self-concept clarity scale, state self-esteem scale, and other demographic and
personality questionnaires. Next, they generated the names of 10 people they dislike, 10
friends, or 10 acquaintances onto a numbered piece of paper. Participants were instructed
to write 10 sentences, one for each name they wrote, using assigned nouns. Following the
sentence-pairing task, participants completed the Inclusion of Other in Self (IOS) scale
for each of the names they wrote. For each name, participants indicated how close they
currently feel to that person and how close they want to feel to that person. Next, they
completed a brief filler task in which they were given a booklet of trivia items and were
given five minutes to study it.
After studying the trivia items, participants were given an unexpected test for
recall of the nouns, names, and pairs of objects and names. First, they received
instructions to type as many of the target nouns on the space available on the computer
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that they remembered. After completing this recall task, participants repeated the same
task, but for the names of the people they generated earlier. Next, participants were given
back their original sheet of names and asked to type on the computer the object that had
been paired with each name in the sentence task. Following these recall tasks,
participants completed the self-concept clarity scale one more time. Finally, they were
debriefed, credited, and dismissed.
Results
Before completing any analyses, I removed 108 participants’ data. Of these
participants, 11 failed one or more control questions (e.g. “Select answer 3 for this
question”), 15 did not complete the names task correctly (e.g. wrote names from the trivia
questions instead of names of people they generated earlier), and 94 did not complete the
noun task correctly (e.g. wrote verbs or other parts of speech instead of nouns, wrote
names from the trivia questions instead of names of people they generated earlier).
Although we tried to make the task as comprehensible to participants as possible, both
through additional written and verbal instructions, a large number of participants still did
not follow the instructions.
Manipulation Check
I used the IOS measure as a manipulation check. I performed a one-way ANOVA
on the effect of condition on average actual and desired closeness to the ten people whose
names the participant wrote (these were averaged to create a composite for each
participant). There was a significant effect of condition on average actual closeness
measured by the IOS, F(2, 329) = 302.13, p < .0001. Planned contrasts indicated that
participants writing about people they liked felt significantly closest to these individuals
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(M = 4.75, SD = 1.00) compared to acquaintances (M = 2.25, SD = .91), t(330) = 19.7, p
< .0001, and compared to disliked others (M = 2.03, SD = .86), t(330) = 22.30, p < .0001.
Participants writing about people who were their acquaintances felt marginally closer to
these individuals compared to disliked others, t(330) = 1.72, p = .09.
There was also a significant effect of condition on average desired closeness
measured by the IOS, F(2, 329) = 324.80, p < .0001. Planned contrasts indicated that
participants writing about people they liked wanted to feel significantly closest to these
individuals (M = 5.61, SD = .98) compared to acquaintances (M = 3.42, SD = 1.27),
t(330) = 15.31, p < .0001, and compared to disliked others (M = 2.15, SD = .88), t(330) =
25.24, p < .0001. Participants writing about people who were their acquaintances also
wanted to t(330) = 8.94, feel significantly closer to these individuals compared to disliked
others, p < .0001. Overall, participants’ actual and desired closeness to the target
individuals matched the condition they were assigned to (See Figure 2.1).
Memory for Names
The names of liked and disliked others should be included in participants’ selfconcepts whereas the names of acquaintances should not. Thus, I expected to see
increased cognitive processing for information associated with liked and disliked others,
but not for acquaintances. A one-way ANOVA was used to measure whether
participants’ recall of names was better when they were names of liked others, disliked
others, or acquaintances. I predicted to find a main effect of person type. I expected that
planned comparisons would indicate that participants will recall more names of disliked
others compared to acquaintances, that participants will recall more names of liked others
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Figure 2.1. Effect of Condition on Average Actual and Desired Closeness to Targets in
Study 1.
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compared to acquaintances, and that participants will recall no more target nouns paired
with liked others versus disliked others.
A one-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 330) =
27.54, p<.0001. Planned comparisons indicated that participants in the liked condition (M
= 9.81, SD = .44) remembered significantly more names than participants in either the
disliked (M = 9.08, SD = 1.00), t(329) = 6.66 p < .0001, or acquaintance (M = 9.11, SD =
.98), t(329) = 6.09, p = .001 conditions. Participants in the disliked and acquaintance
conditions did not differ from each other, t(329) = .26, p = .76 (See Figure 2.2).
Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity on Memory for Names
I also conducted a mediational analysis testing the mediating effects of selfconcept clarity on the relationship between person type and target name recall,
controlling for initial levels of self-concept clarity (See Figure 2.3). Specifically, I
expected to find that greater self-concept clarity will mediate the effects of person type on
target name recall. Because my data included a polytomous categorical independent
variable with a continuous moderator, it was impossible to use the bootstrapping method
or to use an ANOVA. Instead, I dummy coded my independent variable and conducted a
Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found differences only between the liked and
the other two groups, I used the liked category as my comparison group and created
dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.
First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on self-concept
clarity at time 2, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked
variable did not significantly predict self-concept clarity at time 2, B = .03, t(332) = 1.05,
p =.29. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly predict self-
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Figure 2.2. Effect of Condition on Memory for Names and Free and Paired Recall
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Figure 2.3. Model of the Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity on the Relationship
between Condition and Recall.
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concept clarity at time 2, B = .02, t(332) = .69, p =.49. For the b path, I tested the effects
of self-concept clarity at time 2 on names recalled, controlling for initial self-concept
clarity. Self-concept clarity at time 2 did not significantly predict number of names
recalled, B = -.93, t(331) = -.95, p = .34. Next, for the c path, I tested the effects of
dummy-coded condition on target name recall, controlling for initial self-concept clarity.
The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted names recalled, B = -.73,
t(332) = -6.62, p <.0001. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also significantly
predicted names recalled, B = -.69, t(332) = -6.02, p <.0001. Finally, for the c’ path, I
tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on target name recall, controlling for initial
self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable
significantly predicted names recalled, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and selfconcept clarity at time 2, B = -.73, t(322) = -6.56, p <.0001. The dummy coded
acquaintance variable also significantly predicted names recalled, controlling for initial
self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2, B = -.69, t(332) = -5.98, p <.0001.
Thus, because only the c and c’ paths were significant, I do not have significant
mediation.
Mediating Effects of Social State Self-Esteem on Memory for Names
As an exploratory analysis, I conducted the same set of analyses using state social
self-esteem instead of self-concept clarity (See Figure 2.4). I expected that state social
self-esteem would significantly mediate the relationship between condition and memory
for names. For the same reasons as above, I dummy coded my independent variable and
conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found differences only between
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Figure 2.4. Model of the Mediating Effects of State Social Self-Esteem on the
Relationship between Condition and Recall.
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the liked and the other two groups, I used the liked category as my comparison group and
created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.
First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on state social
self-esteem at time 2, controlling for initial state social self-esteem. The dummy coded
disliked variable did not significantly predict state social self-esteem at time 2, B =-.09,
t(332) = -1.32, p =.19. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly
predict state social self-esteem at time 2, B = .06, t(332) = .84, p =.40. For the b path, I
tested the effects of state social self-esteem at time 2 on names recalled, controlling for
initial state social self-esteem. State social self-esteem at time 2 did not predict number of
names recalled, B = -.07, t(333) = -.67, p = .0.51 Next, for the c path, I tested the effects
of dummy-coded condition on target name recall, controlling for initial state self-esteem.
The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted names recalled, B = -.73,
t(332) = -6.64, p <.0001. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also significantly
predicted names recalled, B = -.70, t(332) = -6.08, p <.0001. Finally, for the c’ path, I
tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on target name recall, controlling for initial
state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2. The dummy coded disliked
variable significantly predicted names recalled, controlling for initial state social selfesteem and state social self-esteem at time 2, B = -.74, t(332) = -6.68, p <.0001,. The
dummy coded acquaintance variable also significantly predicted names recalled,
controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2, B = .69, t(332) = -6.03, p <.0001. Thus, because only the c and c’ paths were significant, I do
not have significant mediation.
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Memory for Free-Recall Nouns
A second one-way ANOVA was used to measure whether participants’ free recall
of nouns was better when those nouns had been associated with liked and disliked others
rather than acquaintances. I predict to find a main effect of condition. I also predicted to
find a main effect of person type, in which planned comparisons would indicate that
participants will recall more target nouns that were paired with disliked others compared
to acquaintances, that participants will recall more target nouns that were paired with
liked others compared to unknown others, and that participants will recall no more target
nouns paired with liked others versus disliked others.
A one-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 327) =
6.22, p =.002 (See Figure 2.2). Planned comparisons indicated that participants in the
liked condition (M = 7.37, SD = 2.36) remembered significantly more names than
participants in the disliked (M = 6.35, SD = 2.27), t(326) = 3.52, p =.001, and marginally
more names than participants in the acquaintance (M = 6.80, SD = 1.94), t(326) = 1.87, p
= .06 condition. Participants in the disliked and acquaintance conditions did not differ
from each other, t(326) = 1.49, p = .18.
Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity on Memory for Free Recall Nouns
I also conducted a mediational analysis testing the mediating effects of selfconcept clarity on the relationship between person type and noun free-recall (See Figure
2.3). Specifically, I expect to find that greater self-concept clarity will mediate the effects
of person type on name free recall. For the same reasons as above, I dummy coded my
independent variable and conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found
significant or marginally significant differences only between the liked and the other two
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groups, I used the liked category as my comparison group and created dummy codes for
the disliked and acquaintance group.
First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on self-concept
clarity at time 2, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked
variable did not significantly predict self-concept clarity at time 2, B = .03, t(332) = 1.05,
p =.29. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly predict selfconcept clarity at time 2, B = .02, t(332) = .69, p =.49. For the b path, I tested the effects
of self-concept clarity at time 2 on free-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial selfconcept clarity. Self-concept clarity at time 2 did not significantly predict number of freerecall nouns recalled, B = -.15, t(332) = -.30, p = .77. Next, for the c path, I tested the
effects of dummy-coded condition on memory of free-recall nouns, controlling for initial
self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted freerecall nouns recalled, B = -1.02, t(329) = -3.50, p =.001. The dummy coded acquaintance
variable marginally predicted free-recall nouns recalled, B = -.56, t(329) = -1.83, p =.07.
Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on free-recall noun
recall, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2. The
dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted free-recall nouns recalled,
controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2, B = -1.01,
t(329) = -3.47, p =.001. The dummy coded acquaintance variable marginally predicted
free-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept
clarity at time 2, B = -.55, t(329) = -1.81, p =.07. Thus, because only the c and c’ paths
were significant, I do not have significant mediation.
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Mediating Effects of State Social Self-Esteem on Memory for Free Recall Nouns
As an exploratory analysis, I conducted the same set of analyses using state social
self-esteem instead of self-concept clarity (See Figure 2.4). I expected that state social
self-esteem would significantly mediate the relationship between condition and memory
for names. For the same reasons as above, I dummy coded my independent variable and
conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found differences only between
the liked and the other two groups, I used the liked category as my comparison group and
created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.
First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on state social
self-esteem at time 2, controlling for initial state social self-esteem. The dummy coded
disliked variable did not significantly predict state social self-esteem at time 2, B =-.09,
t(332) = -1.32, p =.19. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly
predict state social self-esteem at time 2, B = .06, t(332) = .84, p =.40. For the b path, I
tested the effects of state social self-esteem at time 2 on free-recall nouns recalled,
controlling for initial state social self-esteem. State social self-esteem at time 2 did not
significantly predict the number of free-recall nouns recalled, B = .30, t(334) = 1.31, p =
.19. Next, for the c path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on noun free
recall, controlling for initial state self-esteem. The dummy coded disliked variable
significantly predicted nouns free recalled, B = -1.02, t(329) = -3.51, p =.001. The
dummy coded acquaintance variable marginally predicted names recalled, B = -.56,
t(329) = -1.83, p =.07. Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded
condition on target name recall, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state
social self-esteem at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted
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nouns free recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social selfesteem at time 2, B = -1.00, t(329) = -3.44, p =.001. The dummy coded acquaintance
variable marginally predicted nouns free recalled, controlling for initial state social selfesteem and state social self-esteem at time 2, B = -.57, t(329) = -1.86, p =.06. Thus,
because only the c and c’ paths were significant, I do not have significant mediation.
Memory for Paired-Recall Nouns
A third one-way ANOVA was used to measure whether participants’ paired recall
of nouns was better when those nouns had been associated with liked and disliked others
rather than acquaintances. I predict to find a main effect of condition. I predicted to find a
main effect of person type, in which planned comparisons would indicate that
participants will recall more target nouns that were paired with disliked others compared
to acquaintances, that participants will recall more target nouns that were paired with
liked others compared to acquaintances, and that participants will recall no more target
nouns paired with liked others versus disliked others.
A one-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 329) =
4.25, p =.02 (See Figure 2.2). Planned comparisons indicated that participants in the liked
condition (M = 7.69, SD = 2.28) remembered significantly more paired recall nouns than
participants in the disliked (M = 6.91, SD = 2.20), t(328) = 2.66, p =.01, and marginally
more names than participants in the acquaintance (M = 6.97, SD = 2.24), t(328) = 2.34, p
= .02 condition. Participants in the disliked and acquaintance conditions did not differ
from each other, t(328) = .21, p = .83.
Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity on Memory for Paired Recall Nouns
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I also conducted a mediational analysis testing the mediating effects of selfconcept clarity on the relationship between person type and noun paired-recall (See
Figure 2.3). Specifically, I expect to find that greater self-concept clarity will mediate the
relationship between person type on noun paired-recall. For the same reasons as above, I
dummy coded my independent variable and conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression.
Because I found significant or marginally significant differences only between the liked
condition and the other two conditions, I used the liked category as my comparison group
and created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.
First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on self-concept
clarity at time 2, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked
variable did not significantly predict self-concept clarity at time 2, B = .03, t(332) = 1.05,
p =.29. The dummy coded acquaintance variable did not significantly predict self-concept
clarity at time 2, B = .03, t(332) = .69, p =.49. For the b path, I tested the effects of selfconcept clarity at time 2 on paired-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial selfconcept clarity. Self-concept clarity at time 2 did not significantly predict number of
paired-recall nouns recalled, B = -.26, t(336) = -.53, p = .59. Next, for the c path, I tested
the effects of dummy-coded condition on memory of paired-recall nouns, controlling for
initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted
paired-recall nouns recalled, B = -.78, t(331) = -2.64, p =.01. The dummy coded
acquaintance variable also significantly predicted paired-recall nouns recalled, B = -.71,
t(331) = -2.30, p =.02. Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded
condition on paired-recall noun recall, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and selfconcept clarity at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted
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paired-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept
clarity at time 2, B = -.77, t(331) = -2.59, p =.01,. The dummy coded acquaintance
variable marginally predicted paired-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial selfconcept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2, B = -.70, t(331) = -2.27, p =.02. Thus,
because only the c and c’ paths were significant, I do not have significant mediation.
Mediating Effects of State Social Self-Esteem on Memory for Paired Recall Nouns
As an exploratory analysis, I conducted the same set of analyses using state social
self-esteem instead of self-concept clarity (See Figure 2.4). I expected that state social
self-esteem would significantly mediate the relationship between condition and memory
for paired recall nouns. For the same reasons as above, I dummy coded my independent
variable and conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found differences
only between the liked and the other two groups, I used the liked category as my
comparison group and created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.
First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on state social
self-esteem at time 2, controlling for initial state social self-esteem. The dummy coded
disliked variable did not significantly predict state social self-esteem at time 2, B =-.09,
t(332) = -1.32, p =.19. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly
predict state social self-esteem at time 2, B = .06, t(332) = .84, p =.40. For the b path, I
tested the effects of state social self-esteem at time 2 on paired-recall nouns recalled,
controlling for initial state social self-esteem. State social self-esteem at time 2 did not
significantly predict the number of paired-recall nouns recalled, B = .13, t(336) = .54, p =
.59. Next, for the c path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on noun paired
recall, controlling for initial state self-esteem. The dummy coded disliked variable
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significantly predicted nouns pair recalled, B = -.78, t(331) = -2.65, p <.01. The dummy
coded acquaintance variable marginally predicted paired nouns recalled, B = -.72, t(331)
= -2.65, p =.02. Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on
paired-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social
self-esteem at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted nouns
paired recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem
at time 2, B = -.78, t(331) = -2.63, p <.01,. The dummy coded acquaintance variable
marginally predicted nouns paired recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem
and state social self-esteem at time 2, B = -.72, t(331) = -2.34, p =.02. Thus, because only
the c and c’ paths were significant, I do not have significant mediation.
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Chapter Three: Study 2
Study 2 was designed to extend Study 1 by examining the effects of including
disliked others into the self-concept. Specifically, I predicted that people will emphasize
their distinctiveness with the disliked other such that people will be faster to classify a
trait as self-descriptive if it is not descriptive of the other and as not self-descriptive if it
is descriptive of the other. I also predicted that emphasizing distinctiveness with the
disliked other will increase people’s self-concept clarity, but performing a similar task
with an acquaintance will not.
Method
Participants
Participants were 237 undergraduates (208 female) from the University of
Kentucky, recruited from the Psychology subject pool. On average, participants were
19.06 years old, SD = 2.65. Participants received partial course credit in exchange for
participating in my study.
Measures
Self-Concept Clarity. Participants completed the Self-Concept Clarity Scale as in
Study 1. This scale demonstrated good reliability, α = .87 for initial self-concept clarity,
α = .90 for self-concept clarity at time 2.
State Social Self-Esteem. Participants completed the social subscale of the State
Self-Esteem Scale as in Study 1. This scale demonstrated good reliability, α = .84 for
initial state social self-esteem, α = .89 for state social self-esteem at time 2.
Inclusion of Other in Self. Participants completed the Inclusion of Other in the
Self Scale as in Study 1.
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Trait Adjective Rating Task. Participants rated how much each of 90 traits applied
to themselves and a disliked other, a liked other, or an acquaintance. These traits were the
same as those used in Aron and colleagues’ (1991) study (See Appendix E). They
included traits that were previously rated as likeable, dislikeable, or neutral. They rated
each item on a scale from 1 (extremely like the target person) to 7 (extremely unlike the
target person). Participants will rate all traits for each person (i.e. self or other) at a time,
before moving on to the next person.
Me/Not Me Reaction Time Task. Participants completed a reaction time task on
the computer in which they were presented with a series of adjectives (as in Aron et al.,
1991). They were instructed to decide as quickly as possible for each one whether it was
descriptive (“me”) or not descriptive (“not me”) of them. Participants indicated whether
or not the trait was descriptive of them based on which key they pressed on the keyboard.
They were told to press E for “me” and I for “not me.” The adjective appeared on the
screen and remained there until the subject pressed one of the keys. The amount of time a
participant took to select one of the keys as well as which key was selected was recorded.
The adjectives that were presented to participants were the same set of 90 adjectives used
earlier. The set was presented two times in different random orders each time.
Procedure
Participants came to the laboratory ostensibly for an experiment about personality
and reaction times. The experimenter informed the participant what the experiment was
about and had them read and sign an informed consent form. First, participants completed
the self-concept clarity and state self-esteem scales as well as some other demographic
and personality questionnaires. Next, they completed the adjective-rating task. In this
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task, participants completed a questionnaire in which they rated 90 trait adjectives in
terms of how much they applied to themselves and a disliked other, a liked other, or an
acquaintance. They then completed the IOS for the disliked other, liked other, or the
acquaintance, indicating how close they felt and wanted to feel to that individual.
Afterwards, participants completed the Me/Not Me reaction time task. In this task, they
indicated whether the same adjectives are self-descriptive or not as fast as they could.
Finally, participants once again completed the self-concept clarity scale. Following this
task, participants were debriefed, credited, and dismissed.
Results
Before doing any analyses, I removed the data of 14 participants, leaving me with
a total of 223. The participants whose data I removed failed one or more of three control
questions (e.g. “Select answer 3 for this question”).
Manipulation Check
I used the IOS measure as a manipulation check. I performed a one-way ANOVA
on the effect of condition on average actual and desired closeness to the other. There was
a significant effect of condition on average actual closeness measured by the IOS, F(2,
219) = 140.22, p < .0001. Planned contrasts indicated that participants describing
attributes of people they liked felt significantly closest to these individuals (M = 5.82, SD
= 1.21) compared to acquaintances (M = 2.48, SD = 1.20), t(218) = 14.62, p < .0001, and
compared to disliked others (M = 2.21, SD = 1.53), t(218) = 15.81, p < .0001. Participants
writing about people who were their acquaintances did not feel significantly closer to
these individuals compared to disliked others, t(218) = 1.33, p = .18.
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There was also a significant effect of condition on average desired closeness
measured by the IOS, F(2, 219) = 98.17, p < .0001. Planned contrasts indicated that
participants describing attributes of people they liked wanted to feel significantly closest
to these individuals (M = 6.14, SD = 1.11) compared to acquaintances (M = 4.11, SD =
1.56), t(218) = 7.19, p < .0001, and compared to disliked others (M = 2.12, SD = 1.90),
t(218) = 13.92, p < .0001. Participants describing attributes of people who were their
acquaintances also wanted to feel significantly closer to these individuals compared to
disliked others, t(218) = 7.94, p < .0001. Although participants’ actual closeness to the
acquaintances and disliked others did not significantly differ, they did desire to be
significantly closer to the acquaintance than the disliked other. This pattern of results
suggests that participants’ actual and desired closeness to the target individuals matched
the condition they were assigned to (See Figure 3.1).
Pre-analysis coding
Adjective ratings were divided such that those with ratings of 5 or higher were
considered descriptive of the target person and those with ratings of 3 or lower were
considered not descriptive of the target person. Adjective ratings of 4, the midpoint of the
scale, were not considered given that this would indicate that the adjective was neither
descriptive nor not descriptive of the target person. The adjectives were next divided into
categories for each subject according to their pattern for the three target people. Response
times were averaged based on category.
There were three possible combinations of descriptive and not-descriptive traits of
each of the two people: traits descriptive of both the self and other (disliked other, liked
other, or acquaintance), traits descriptive of the self but not of the other, and traits not
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Figure 3.1. Effect of Condition on Actual and Desired Closeness to Target in Study 2.
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descriptive of self but descriptive of the other. I did not find any differences between the
second two categories. I thus collapsed them into one category. This left us with two
categories: traits descriptive of both the self and other and traits descriptive of either the
self or the other.
Effects of Condition and Attribute Type on Reaction Time
Before doing any analyses, I also corrected for extreme reaction times (i.e.
reaction times likely to be errors rather than real reaction times). Extreme times were
defined as times faster than 300 ms or slower than 3000 ms. These times were replaced
with those boundary limits (e.g. any time faster than 300 ms was re-coded as 300 ms)
(e.g. Greenwald, McGee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).
A 2 (descriptive of self and other vs. descriptive of self or other) x 3
(acquaintance vs. disliked other vs. liked other) repeated measures analysis of variance
was conducted on the reaction times. I expected to find a significant interaction. I
expected that participants would classify adjectives more slowly when they were
descriptive of themselves and (rather than or) the disliked other, but that participants
would classify adjectives more slowly when they were descriptive of themselves or
(rather than and) the liked other. I did not expect any difference among classification
speed based on category for the acquaintance however.
I found a significant interaction between attribute type and condition, F(2, 182) =
5.40, p < .01 (See Figure 3.2). To probe this interaction, I examined the effects of
condition on reaction time when attributes were one of two different types (descriptive of
both self and other vs. descriptive of self or other). First I examined the effects of
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Figure 3.2. Interaction between Condition and Attribute Type on Reaction Time.
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condition on reaction time for attributes descriptive of both the self and the other. I found
no significant differences in reaction times between the disliked (M = 1074.08, SD =
256.59) and acquaintance (M = 1062.33, SD = 249.64) conditions, F(1, 205) = .13, p =
.72. There was also no significant difference in reaction times between the acquaintance
and liked (M = 1031.06, SD = 180.94) conditions, F(1, 205) = 1.53, p = .22. Finally, there
was no difference between the liked and disliked conditions, F(1, 205) = 2.28, p = .13.
For the attributes descriptive of both the self and the other, there were no differences
between conditions.
Next, I examined the effects of condition on reaction time for attributes
descriptive of either the self or the other. I found a marginally significant difference in
reaction times between the disliked (M = 1062.97, SD = 198.01) and acquaintance (M =
1125.21, SD = 278.56) conditions, F(1, 190) = 3.15, p = .08. There was no significant
difference in reaction times between the acquaintance and liked (M = 1160.40, SD =
243.47) conditions, F(1, 190) = .14, p = .71. Finally, I found a marginally significant
difference in reaction times between the liked and disliked conditions, F(1, 190) = 3.68, p
= .06.
Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity
I initially planned to conduct a moderated mediation analysis to test the mediating
effects of self-concept clarity on the interaction between descriptive type and person type
on reaction time. However, because one of the independent variables was a repeated
measures variable and the mediator was not, it was impossible to conduct this analysis.
Given that the moderation did not work out as I predicted, even if I was able to do this
analysis, interpreting it would be challenging.
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Effects of Condition and Attribute Type on Response Errors
I conducted a 2 (descriptive of self and other vs. descriptive of self or other) x 3
(acquaintance vs. disliked other vs. liked other) repeated measures analysis of variance on
the response errors. Recall that a response error was classified as an attribute rated by
participants as descriptive of them in the attribute-rating task but not descriptive of them
in the reaction time task or the reverse. I expected to find a significant interaction. I
expected that participants would make more response errors for attributes descriptive of
themselves and (rather than or) the disliked other, but that participants would make more
response errors when they were descriptive of themselves or (rather than and) the liked
other. I did not expect any difference among number of response errors based on category
for the acquaintance however.
The interaction was not significant, F(2, 195) = 2.04, p = .13 (see Figure 3.3). The
number of response errors made by participants in the disliked condition (M = 3.31, SD =
3.99 for attributes descriptive of self and other; M = 3.56, SD = 2.53 for attributes
descriptive of self or other) did not significantly differ from the number of response
errors made by participants in the acquaintance condition (M = 2.55, SD = 3.65 for
attributes descriptive of self and other; M = 3.62, SD = 2.94 for attributes descriptive of
self or other) nor the liked condition (M = 3.35, SD = 3.94 for attributes descriptive of
self and other; M = 3.05, SD = 2.20 for attributes descriptive of self or other).
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Figure 3.3. Interaction between Condition and Attribute Type on Response Errors.
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Chapter Four: Discussion
The self-concept is inherently socially based. People’s self-concepts significantly
impact how they interact with others. In turn, others significantly impact our selfconcepts. Other people are thus a fundamental part of our self-concepts. Indeed, previous
research suggests that people extend their selves to incorporate close others into their
self-concepts (e.g. Aron et al., 1991). Such self-expansion involves self-other overlap.
People are motivated to draw closer to liked others and in doing so, they take on their
attributes (Aron et al., 1991; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). The current research tested
whether disliked others are incorporated into the self-concept and what the implications
are. I proposed that people would show the same memory bias for disliked as for liked
others and that people would be motivated to be distinct from disliked others, as
evidenced by faster reaction times for traits not descriptive of the self but descriptive of
the other. I also proposed that including disliked others into the self-concept would
increase people’s self-concept clarity.
Two studies, using multiple measures and methods, failed to show support for this
hypothesis. Study 1 showed that liked others, but not disliked others or acquaintances, are
included in the self-concept. The self-concept inclusion for liked others was evidenced by
a memory bias for words associated with liked others compared to acquaintances and
compared to disliked others. The same bias was not shown for disliked others or
acquaintances. I tested whether including liked others in the self-concept increased
people’s self-concept clarity or state social self-esteem by testing for moderated
mediation. There was no significant mediating effect of either self-concept clarity or state
social self-esteem.
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Study 2 attempted to show that people enhance their distinctiveness from disliked
others by correctly classifying traits more quickly and making more response errors when
they are different from the disliked other on that trait. I also expected to replicate Aron
and colleagues’ (1991) effect that people enhance their similarity to liked others by
correctly classifying traits when they are different from the liked other on that trait and
more slowly classifying traits when they are similar from the liked other on that trait
more quickly. My analyses did not support either of these predictions. There were no
differences between participants’ reaction times on classifying attributes that were
descriptive of the self or the other or that were descriptive of the self and the other based
on what condition they were in. There were also no differences between participants’
response errors on classifying attributes that were descriptive of the self or the other or
that were descriptive of the self and the other based on what condition they were in.
This research suggests that affect may be important in determining what types of
people are included in the self-concept. The determining factor of whether someone is
included in the self-concept appears not to be their level of significance to the person, but
the nature of their relationship toward this person. Previous research demonstrates that
liked others are incorporated into the self-concept through an affiliation-based
motivation. People are motivated to become more similar to liked others (e.g. Aron et al.,
1991; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). As a result, they engage in a
variety of cognitions and behaviors that involve drawing closer to them. The present
studies partially replicated previous research showing that liked others are included in the
self-concept. Names of and nouns associated with liked others were remembered better
than names of and nouns associated with disliked others or acquaintances. However,
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unlike previous research, participants in the liked other condition were not any faster in
classifying attributes associated with the self and other compared to the self or other and
participants in the acquaintance and disliked other conditions. It is possible that
participants in the acquaintance and disliked conditions were not as certain of the
attributes of their acquaintances and disliked others as participants in the liked other
condition were. Unfortunately I did not ask participants’ about their knowledge of
acquaintances’ and disliked others’ traits, so there is no way of knowing whether this is
the case. If participants were less certain of acquaintances and disliked others’ traits, it
could be one of the driving forces behind the absence of this effect. More broadly, the
results of this research suggest that perhaps affect does matter and negative information is
not incorporated into the self-concept.
Limitations and Future Directions
There are several limitations that may serve as avenues for further research. First,
there was a lot of data that had to be excluded from the analysis. In Study 1, 108
participants’ data was unusable because participants did not follow instructions. Although
the instructions were written clearly and the experimenters explained the tasks in detail as
per Greenwald & Banaji’s original study (1989), a large number of participants either still
did not understand the tasks or did not take them seriously. I further clarified the task
instructions in the middle of the study when it was clear participants were
misunderstanding them, but this did not seem to help. For example, it was clear that about
15 participants did not understand what a noun was and instead identified verbs or other
words when asked to report nouns. Many more participants gave nouns or names
associated with the earlier trivia task or associated with neither task rather than the ones
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associated with the earlier name-generating activity as they were instructed to do.
Because I had a very large sample size to begin with, I do not think power was an issue in
my analyses. However, there may have been other participants who were not paying
attention or taking the task seriously.
Next, it is possible that the relationship to the disliked other is a moderating factor
in whether or not this person is incorporated in the self-concept. Slotter and colleagues’
(2013) research suggests that when a person is motivated to incorporate aspects of a
disliked other (i.e. romantic rival) in the self-self-concept for the purposes of materetention, they will do so. However, when a person lacks this motivation, they do not
show the same effect. Perhaps people are only motivated to incorporate certain types of
disliked others in order to differentiate themselves from this person. Future research
could investigate the moderating role of types of disliked others on self-concept
inclusion. For example, would people be more likely to include a romantic partner’s expartners in their self-concept for the purpose of distinguishing themselves from these
people for a similar mate-retention purpose?
Finally, although participants were able to come up with disliked others to think
about while completing the studies, many had difficulty coming up with 10 (in Study 1).
It could be that the disliked others that participants listed were not very important to them
in general. If the disliked others were not significant figures in participants’ lives, it is
likely they would not be included in the self-concept, just as liked others who are not
significant figures in participants’ lives are not.
Enemies do not play a prominent role in the lives of people in America in general
(e.g. Adams, 2005). Contrastingly, enemyship is “built into everyday worlds” as a
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cultural norm in West African societies (Adams, 2005). This difference is attributed to
cultural differences in the self-concept, specifically independent versus interdependent
selves. People in West African societies have interdependent selves, that is selves that are
defined more in terms of their relationships with others, whereas people in the U.S. have
independent selves, selves that are defined more in terms of their internal attributes
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Because of this, enemies or disliked others play a more
significant role in the lives of people with interdependent self-concepts. Future research
would benefit from replicating these studies using participants from a society with
interdependent self-concepts, where disliked others are more likely to play a significant
role in people’s lives and thus more likely to be included in the self-concept.
Concluding Remarks
Preliminary research shows that disliked others are not included in the selfconcept. It could be that they do not play a significant enough role in people’s lives to be
included in their self-concepts or that affect matters when determining whether or not
people or other information is included in the self-concept. Additionally, including others
into the self-concept does not increase a person’s self-concept clarity or their state social
self-esteem. People do not know who they are by knowing who they are not.
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Appendix A
Self-Concept Clarity Scale
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following items on a scale of 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)"
1. RIGHT NOW, my beliefs about myself often conflict with one another.*
2. RIGHT NOW, on one day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I
might have a different opinion.*
3. RIGHT NOW, I spend a lot of time wondering about what kind of person I really am.*
4. RIGHT NOW, I feel that I am not really the person that I appear to be.*
5. RIGHT NOW, when I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I'm not
sure what I was really like.*
6. RIGHT NOW, I seldom experience conflict between the different aspects of my
personality.
7. RIGHT NOW, I think I know other people better than I know myself. *
8. RIGHT NOW, my beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently.*
9. RIGHT NOW, if I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up
being different from one day to another day.*
10. RIGHT NOW, even if I wanted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm really
like.*
11. RIGHT NOW, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am.
12. RIGHT NOW, it is hard for me to make up my mind about things because I don't
really know what I want.*
* Indicates reverse-keyed item.
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Appendix B
State Social Self-Esteem
This is a questionnaire designed to measure what you are thinking at this moment. There
is, of course, no right answer for any statement. The best answer is what you feel is true
of yourself at this moment, be sure to answer all of the items, even if you are not certain
of the best answer. Again, answer these questions as they are true for you RIGHT NOW
using the scale below:
1
(not at all)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

2

3
4
(somewhat)

5

6

7
(extremely)

RIGHT NOW, I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure
RIGHT NOW, I feel self-conscious
RIGHT NOW, I feel displeased with myself
RIGHT NOW, I am worried about what other people think of me
RIGHT NOW, I feel inferior to others at this moment
RIGHT NOW, I feel concerned about the impression that I am making
RIGHT NOW, I am worried about looking foolish
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Appendix C
Nouns Used in Sentence-Writing Task
BROCCOLI
HOCKEY
PUZZLES
DESK
TOMATO
RULER
VAN
SHOES
EAGLE
ARROW
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Appendix D
Inclusion of Other in Self Scale
We would like to ask you a few questions about your feelings of closeness to person #110. Please use the following picture to answer the questions below.

Please select a number, corresponding to the circles below, that represents how close you
CURRENTLY feel to person #1-10.
Please select a number, corresponding to the circles below, that represents how close you
WANT to feel to person #1-10.
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Appendix E
List of 90 Traits used in Aron et al.’s (1991) original study and in Study 2
ACTIVE
AGGRESSIVE
ALERT
AMBITIOUS
AMUSING
ANTISOCIAL
APPRECIATIVE
ARGUMENTATIVE
ATTENTIVE
BLUNT
BOASTFUL
CHEERFUL
CHOOSY
COLD
CONGENIAL
CONSIDERATE
CORDIAL
COWARDLY
CREATIVE
CRUDE
DECEPTIVE
DOMINEERING
DULL
EMOTIONAL
ENVIOUS
FOOLHARDY
FOOLISH
FORWARD
FRANK
GENEROUS
GOOD-TEMPERED
HOT-HEADED
ILL-MANNERED
INDEPENDENT
INVENTIVE
IRRATIONAL
IRRITABLE
JEALOUS
LAZY
MATERIALISTIC
MATURE
METHODICAL
NAIVE
NEAT
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NONCHALANT
NOSEY
OBJECTIVE
OBSERVANT
OPPORTUNIST
PERSISTENT
PERSUASIVE
PREJUDICED
PRODUCTIVE
PROMPT
PROUD
RESPONSIBLE
RESTLESS
SARCASTIC
SCORNFUL
SELF-CENTERED
SELF-RELIANT
SELF-RIGHTEOUS
SENSIBLE
SERIOUS
SHOWY
SHREWD
SHY
SKEPTICAL
SOPHISTICATED
SPENDTHRIFT
SPITEFUL
SUBMISSIVE
SUPERFICIAL
SUSPICIOUS
SYMPATHETIC
SYSTEMATIC
TACTFUL
TACTLESS
TENDER
TIMID
TOLERANT
TRUSTING
UNFAIR
UNPREDICTABLE
UNRELIABLE
VAIN
VERSATILE
WEAK
WORDY
WORRIER
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